Libyan Air Force At Last Is Out To Blast Outlaws:

 

The GNC declared south Libya a "military zone" and temporarily closed its borders with Sudan, Niger, Chad and Algeria. The move came two days after the PM Ali Zidan arrived from his tour of Algeria, Chad, Niger and Sudan [1]. On the 19th of December 2012 the Libyan News Agency reported that Ali Zidan informed the GNC of his preparations to send forces to the south and to appoint a "Military Governor" for the military zone. He also advised locals to steer away from the border areas that are not permissible by law [4], otherwise they will be "blasted" by the Libyan Air Force [5]. The PM's stark warning was cheered and applauded by a number of the GNC's present members.

By the 19th of December, the Libyan News Agency LANA [2] had reported that Kufra's military commander, Colonel Miftah Alabdali, said Libyan Air force was already combing the area along the Chadian and the southern Egyptian borders. It was also reported that at least one suspected camp was blasted on Tuesday morning.

Border problems all over Libya were known from day one of Liberation, but apparently both the NTC and el-Keib's governments were "powerless" to effect a full solution to the issue. At last, after 14 months of local complaints, the Prime Minister Ali Zidan promised the Berber Tuareg that securing the borders and resolving the Daraj disaster would be among his government's priorities, when he met with Tuareg representatives from all over Libya on the 27th of November 2012.

But on the 6th of December 2012 at least 20 Fezzani members of the GNC had suspended their membership in a protest about the deteriorating security in Fezzan, and even accused the Ministry of Defence and the GNC of not responding to their proposed plan which calls for the resignation of the military commander of the southern area, Abdurrahman Athawil, and the commander of the "operations room", Wanis Bokhmadah [3].

Even security officials working for the transitional government accused the ministries of defence and interior of negligence after they failed to provide support for the fighting units in Sabha, during the clashes at Brak Ashathi in September 2012. When the government security forces returned to Tripoli they surrounded the Roxis Hotel and threatened to "blow up" the hotel unless their demands to meet with the minister of Interior, Fawzi Abdulal, and the minister of defence, Osama Ajwaili, were met. The returned security forces wanted to know why their demands for support and aid were ignored [8].

The decision to declare the area a military zone has angered a number of Tuareg leaders, and according to the head of the Amazigh World Congress, Fathi Benkhlifa, Benghazi could be more deserving of such militarisation [6]. There are far more dangerous developments still taking place in Cyrenaica and along the Musaid border with Egypt which are damaging to Libya's reputation and which could or otherwise would derail the revolution.

Therefore the question to ask is why does not the Libyan Air Force exercise its muscle along the eastern and western borders as well as inside Libya itself? And why declare the whole region a military zone when the matter seemingly is no more than border patrol?

The Libyans of the south on the other hand had never resorted to shutting down oil fields or water or power supplies or public roads just to demand scholarship for their revolutionaries, unpaid wages, or urgent medical treatment abroad for their wounded, or even semi-autonomy at home just to provide food and shelter for their own impoverished and war-torn people. And they had burnt no embassies nor blew up any government offices or assassinated scores of Libyans as is the norm in Cyrenaica. Instead they say they are still waiting patiently for  the government to do the right thing, and that their impoverished region was hijacked by foreign elements to traffic in humans, arms, drugs and other 'contrabanda' agendas ever since the presumed and premature liberation of Libya. 

On the following day, the 20th of December 2012, the president of the GNC, Dr. Magarief, met with Tuareg leaders in Tripoli and, according to Solidarity Press, he promised to resolve all their problems [7]. This sounds very promising, but the source failed to say when the promise will be fulfilled or how the GNC's president could have the "magic wand" to re-solve "all the Tuareg's problems".

Many of the Berber Tuareg, the Tebu and the Arab tribes of Fezzan still live in tattered huts and palm-frond shelters in extreme poverty, beneath the scorching heat of the Sahara's sun, and without any of the air-conditions and the other signs of the luxury others enjoy along the shores of Tripoli and at the 5-star Roxis Hotel. It is impossible to imagine these "mere hamlets" live in rich Libya today, let alone free Libya; as much as it is possible to perceive Libya itself does not exist beyond the boundaries of Tripoli - except that Benghazi is seemingly being punished for trying to take a share of that "policy".

On the 21st of December 2012 a relief convoy left Zuwarah for the south, carrying food, medical supplies, clothing and blankets -- the good, old Libyan spirit: the people are helping each other.

Sources:

[1]: http://www.libyaherald.com/2012/12/17/gnc-announces-temporary-closure-of-southern-borders-and-declares-south-a-closed-military-zone
[2]: http://www.lana-news.ly/ar/art.php?a=31208
[3]: http://www.presssolidarity.net/نواب-المؤتمر-الوطني-عن-سبها-يعلقون-عضو/
[4]: http://www.lana-news.ly/ar/art.php?a=31295
[5]: https://www.youtube.com/v/7ghPXUpxOkk?hl=en_GB&version=3&rel=0"
[6]: http://ossanlibya.org/?p=30417
[7]: http://www.presssolidarity.net/المقريف-يعد-طوارق-ليبيا-بحل-جميع-مشاكل/
[8]: http://www.presssolidarity.net/قوات-من-اللجنة-الأمنية-تحاصر-فندق-ريكس/

The End of The General Board for Tourism and Antiquities

 Made by Mesratha's "Revolutionaries of The Central Workshop". Photo source: temehu.com.

In its second regular meeting of the 28th of November 2012 the transitional Council of Ministers had devolved the Antiquities Department's assets and terms of reference to the Ministry of Culture and Civil Society. The Council of Ministers had also dissolved the General Board for Tourism and Antiquities (الهيئة العامة للسياحة والآثار) and devolved all its assets and functions to the newly created Ministry of Tourism.

Libya Gets its Tourism Ministry, At Last

The new transitional cabinet, proposed today by Dr. Ali Zidan, includes two women: Ikram Imam, the minister of tourism, and Kamila Almazini, minister of social affairs. Temehu welcomes the appointment of a female minister to administer tourism in Libya. The only country in the world in 2012 where women form more than half of the parliament (lower or single House) is African Rwanda (57%), followed by Andorra (50%), and Cuba and Sweden (45%). Libya and the USA are far behind, nearly at the end of the table. 

Short Biography of Engineer Ikram Imam:

• Full name: Ikram Abdussalam Bash Imam (اكرام عبدالسلام باش امام).
• Age: 59.
• Bachelor's Degree in Architectural Engineering, Tripoli University, 1975.
• Worked as Head of Design and Manager of the Projects Department, which included hotels and residential blocks.
• Worked at the Religious Affairs Board.
• Worked at the General Board of Tourism.
• Was a member of the committee that oversaw the establishment of Tourism Law Project.
• Presented a study for establishing the founding structure of tourism projects.
• Member of the committee entrusted to follow-up the general plan for tourism.
• Contributed with design and management of Libya's wings at a number of international tourism exhibitions.

 

Source of data: .pdf file published by the GNC. 

Download the full file and a list of the new cabinet proposed by Dr. Ali Zidan from: https://www.temehu.com/GNC/Ali-Zidans-cabinet-30October2012.pdf




 

Election Results Errors & Unexplained Violations of Article (6) of the Constitutional Declaration: Updated

	'Political Entities': الكيانات السياسية	Percentage	Seats
1	National Forces Alliance	48.8%	39
2	Justice and Construction	21.3%	17
3	The National Front Party	3.8%	3
4	Wadi Alhayat Gathering	2.5%	2
5	The Union for Homeland	2.5%	2
6	National Centrist Party	2.5%	2
	All other parties	18.8%	15
		Total: 100.2%	Total: 80

• Article (30) of the Constitutional Declaration (CD)  says the NTC must within 90 days of liberation issue a special law for electing the General National Congress and for appointing the HNEC. But Law 4/2012 was passed on 28th of January 2012. Law 29 itself, regulating 'political parties', was passed on the 2nd of May 2012; and applying for registering political parties was only scheduled to start from the 26th of May 2012. The Constitutional Amendment Number 3 (2012) was passed on the 5th of July 2012 -- just two days before the election day.
  
  

•  The published percentages add up to 100.2%, even though the PDFfile published by the HNEC shows the total to be 100.0%. This may be considered as a minor error and should be ignored, no doubt, but considering it is to do with "counting" and more so with "counting votes", accuracy is paramount, simply because such errors would naturally shed some doubt over the accuracy of the results overall.  
  
  
• Only 12 constituencies (or districts) out of 13 constituencies are included in party elections. The excluded constituency, by mere chance, happened to be "Constituency 8" -- largely dominated by the [persecuted] Berbers of Nafousa Mountain and the Berbers of Ghadames. Why one constituency out of all other Libyan constituencies is barred from taking part in party elections? There were a number of issues and inconsistencies in relation to both the constitutional declaration and the whole electoral system adopted by the NTC. The Carter report recommended that "In future, the election management body should give careful consideration to the protection of minority rights in the voter registration process [p. 13]."
  
  
• Article (6) of the ConstitutionalDeclaration "promises" all Libyans "equal opportunities", and while NTC's Law14/2012 lists a total of 13 constituencies in Libya (even though the numbers in the table jump from 7 to 9, giving a total of 12 and not 13), in reality only 12 constituencies were allowed to take part in the party-election; thereby depriving Libyan voters from one single constituency from having equal opportunity to vote for party-elections. On the other hand, most of the other constituencies were allowed to vote for both: "parties" and "individuals" --  even though the Shahed report (see below) stated that one of the HNEC staff in Derna had prevented the use of both voting ballots (individuals and parties) and asked voters to use only one of them!
  
  
• Of course, Article (6) of the Constitutional Declaration violates the Constitutional Declaration itself by declaring all Libyans are "equal" regardless of "language", while at the same time Article (1) declares "Arabic" the only official language in Libya -- even though "Berber" is the native language of Libya and not Arabic. [See the Carter Centre Statement, below, for further violations of the Constitutional Declaration.]
  
  
• Serious violations in Tripoli were reported by "Shahed Network for Election Monitoring" (see  election observers' reports, below): "there were noticeable campaigns inside the polling centre to affect the voters. This contradicts the election Law and procedures and considered as a serious violation of voters’ right to vote freely, therefore, Shahed team call the HNEC to consider all procedures that prevent these abuses."
  
  
• HNEC Staff Violations: the Shahed report reveals more serious violations by officials to influence the voters to favour a particular party in Sbeedat School centre in the "seventh constituency". Also voters in Shohadaa Alkhaleej School centre were influenced by an "active campaign" for the favour of some [unnamed] party. In one of women's centres in Murzuq the voters were influenced to favour one particular unnamed party. In Khoms (centre No. 1003152) the wrong candidate lists were delivered to the centre; and the voters’ lists from Khoms were mixed with other voters' lists from Meslateh.
  
  
• Special Needs: according to the Shahed Report, 15% of the polling centres were unqualified to receive people with special needs, thereby preventing this category of Libyans from their right to vote. The Shahed report can be downloaded from the website of the HNEC, or by clicking on the link provided at the end of these observations.
  
  
• The only Libyan website so far to reference the violation of Article (6) is Alwatan (ملاحظاتحول الانتخابات الليبية يمكن أن تشكل خروقات انتخابية يجوز الطعن فيها). According to Dr. Abdullah Arrabthi, from the Medicine College at Tripoli University, there are other "breaches" that may warrant the results to be legally challenged against Article (6), such as the election and party laws were not published early enough to allow parties and candidates enough time to make themselves known to the voters. One comment left for Dr. Arrabthi's report stated that Mahmoud Jibril used his photo for the advertising campaign for the NFA even though he is not a candidate, and that many Libyans were puzzled not to find his name in the list of the candidates they voted for; implying that people thought they were voting for Mahmoud Jibril when in fact he is not a candidate.
  
  
• Appeals: the HNEC in its website (http://www.hnec.ly/modules/publisher/item.php?itemid=350) announced that voters have two days to lodge any appeals they might have, starting from the date on which the results were released. The results were published on the 17th of July at 9pm (3 hours before the end of the day), but this appeal announcement was published by the HNEC in its website on the 18th of July -- a day after the results were made known. The two days are followed by a total 12 days for the judges to look into the appeals, according to the following process:
  وذكر "العبار" أن هذه الفترة ستستمر لمدة أربعة عشر يوما وقد خُصصت على النحو التالي : يومان للطعن في النتائج الآولية ، ثم يومان للنظر في الطعن من قبل القاضي الجزئي ، ثم خمسة لاستئناف قرار القاضي الجزئي ، ثم خمسة أيام أخر للنظر في الإستئناف من قبل رئيس المحكمة الإبتدائية أو من يفوضه ، وذلك وفقا للقانون رقم أربعة، وأضاف أن بعد إستكمال مرحلة الطعون سيتم الإعلان عن النتائج النهائية والمصادقة عليها ، والتي ستبدأ بها مرحلة انتقال السلطة من المجلس الوطني الإنتقالي المؤقت إلى المؤتمر الوطني العام
  

Election Observers' Reports:

The HNEC's website lists four reports, by the African Union, Shahed Network for Election Monitoring, the Arab league, and the Carter Centre. The Carter report linked to from the website of the HNEC contains hardly any observations, let alone violations, in comparison to the copy found at the website of the Carter Centre itself. In this Carter's report one reads, "Many people who spoke with Carter Center observers expressed excitement at their new ability to speak freely and to discuss politics without fear of intimidation." The following observations were extracted from the Shahed and the Carter reports:

(1) - The Shahed Report:

• "Shahed Network is a domestic election observation initiative. It consists of civil society organizations and individuals in each of the (13) main constituencies in Libya. Shahed is committed to observing the electoral process in accordance with internationally recognized standards of domestic election observation. The network consists of volunteers who plan to be present in as many polling stations as possible. Shahed Network is working with, and supported by NDI."
  
  
• High turnout in Tripoli, Misrata, Benghazi and Sabha.
• Modest turnout in Albaydaa and Ajdabya.
• HNEC staff were transparent in their methods and procedures.
• Up to 96% of the polling stations witnessed the availability of all the necessary materials required.
• The necessary materials for the election process were not delivered to Khaled Bin Alwaleed School centre in Brega.
• There are a number of incidents where HNEC staff showed lack of understanding of voting procedures: one of the staff in Darnah area prevented the use of both voting ballots (individuals and parties) and asked voters to use only one of them.
• Albayda: there has been total chaos due to the absence of the staff responsible for female voters.
• Ain Zara centre: the wrong voting ballots were delivered to the centre.
• Khoms (centre No. 1003152): the wrong candidate lists were delivered to the centre; and the  voters’ lists from Khoms were mixed with other voters' lists from Msellatah.
  
  
• Shahed team observed that most of the polling centres were easily reachable with no obstacles.
• 15% of the polling centres were unqualified to receive people with special needs, preventing this category of Libyans from their right of voting.
• Delay in opening some polling stations, as in Shohadaa Azzawiah School centre in Benghazi, Awad Abbar School centre, centre No. (40022), Zarqa Alyamamah centre, centre No. (031402), and Ibraheem Gazaari School centre.
  
  
• Most of the polling centres witnessed a good security environment.
• Major security violations in Albaydaa, Ajdabya and Tobruk:
  
  
• Polling centres were attacked and voting process suspended in many polling centres.
• Voting materials were stolen in Attaleah School centre; apparent chaos.
• Voting materials were stolen: the following centres were attacked by armed men who threatened the staff of the HNEC to stop the election process:
• Annahdah School
• Independence School
• Omar Mukhtar School
• Martyrs of the Damour School
• Ali Issa School
• Wehdah School
• Tarek ibn Ziyad School
  
  
• All the polling centres in Ajdabya were attacked and suffered from "total chaos".
• Khansaa School centre in Albaydaa: total chaos reported, due to a "brawl in the polling centre".
• Marej: voting boxes were stolen and the centre was attacked.
• Ballot boxes were stolen in centre No. (0100741) by a "group of armed men with white guns".
• Ashbelieh centre in "Gryan": the staff and women voters were attacked: shooting, chaos and stealing ballot boxes.
• Alquba: Afreeqa centre was attacked by armed men.
• Ekhlas and Karameh School centre:  ballot boxes were stolen by armed men.
  
  
• Benghazi:
• Freedom School: explosives (gelatin) were used in the polling centres:
• Ibraheem Jarari School centre: was completely destroyed.
• Brigades of Freedom School: attacked by a number of armed men who "detained the staff", with "total chaos" and "shooting inside the centre".
• Jamal Abdel Nasser School was "burned in Gmenes".
  
  
• Ajdabya-Wehdah centre: ballot boxes were stolen.
• Ajdabya: Independence School centre: ballot boxes were stolen.
• Alabyar: the polling centre was burned.
• Shohadaa Abo Eareeq centre: polling centre was burned.
• Omar Mukhtar School centre: attacked and the voting process was suspended.
  
  
• Tripoli: Qalaah School centre: the observers and candidates representatives were dismissed by the station director.
• Tripoli: Halab School centre: there were "noticeable campaigns inside the polling centre to affect the voters. This contradicts the election Law and procedures and considered as a serious violation of voters’ right to vote freely, therefore, Shahed team call the HNEC to consider all procedures that prevent these abuses."
  

(2) - The Carter Report:

• "The Carter Center conducted a limited election observation mission, accrediting 45 observers from 21 countries and deploying 16 teams of observers. On election day, observers visited more than 160 polling stations in 11 of 13 electoral districts, including teams in Ajdabiya, Al Bayda, Zuwiya, Gharyan, Khoms, Benghazi, Sebha, Sabrata, Tobruk, Tripoli, and Zuwara."
  
  
• "Carter Center observers were present for the full count at only eight polling stations. This sample is too small to offer a reliable assessment of the counting process."
  
  
• Violations of the Constitutional Declaration: according to the Carter report published at: http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/pr/libya-prelim-statement-070912.pdf , "On July 5, 2012, just two days before election day, the NTC issued a third amendment to the interim constitution, this time stating that the election of the constitution drafting body would be carried out through free and direct suffrage, “taking into consideration Libya’s cultural and linguistic diversity.” This change is inconsistent with best practice, which calls for no changes to the legal framework within three months of an election [8]. In this case, the decision may have impaired voters’ ability to understand what they were voting for and thus to make an informed choice."
  
  
• "In future, the election management body should give careful consideration to the protection of minority rights in the voter registration process [p. 13]."
  
  
• NTC's elections law does not include all the provisions governing the electoral process. Many important provisions were left to the executive regulations issued by HNEC over a period of four months and up to seven days before election day.
  
  
• Since the release of the controversial constitutional declaration and the ensued elections and constituencies laws, the Berbers of Tripolitania (including Nafusa), the Cyrenaicans, and the Libyans of Fezzan were protesting against the electoral system and its multitude of laws and amendments issued by the NTC without consultation with the Libyan people. But no one came to their aid with some "observations".  The Carter Statement says the Electoral System adopted by the NTC, which uses three electoral systems for the GNC elections,  made it more difficult for political entities, candidates, and voters to understand the process; and it also had implications for counting and tabulation. "While elections in general aim to determine the will of the people and to promote their right to select their own government, the specific type of electoral system that is chosen promotes different types of representation and political behavior."
  
  
• There "were isolated incidents of [candidate] posters being defaced or torn down in Benghazi during the last week of June. As the election drew closer, observers noted that posters had been damaged in several other cities, including Zuwarah, Al Bayda, and Derna."
  
  
• "Future electoral management bodies should devote increased resources and efforts to conduct voter information and education campaigns to deepen the voters’ understanding of the process and encourage increased participation in the political process."
  
  
• Several young voters were potentially excluded from the process due to an early cutoff of the registration deadline [25]."
  
  
• The "design of the electoral system and the quota structure does not guarantee gender equity in the congress. The Carter Center strongly urges that measures be implemented to ensure the effective representation of women in any elected assembly in the future [12]."
  
  
• "Although women played a notable role during the uprising, only 585 women registered as candidates. The vast majority of female candidates registered on the PR list. Only 85 women registered as individual candidates."
  
  
• The "brief exhibition period did not adequately allow voters to review the registry and make the necessary corrections."
  
  
• "The HNEC announced the final lists of candidates on June 18, 2012, less than three weeks before election day, leaving a very narrow window for the candidates to campaign."
  
  
• "The election commission did not monitor probable violations of campaign finance regulations during the campaign period . . . "
  
  
• "The Center regrets that only 8,043 overseas voters cast a ballot in these historic elections . . . While geographic considerations were taken into account, there are questions about the choice not to extend OCV to certain countries where large numbers of Libyan nationals reside, such as in Egypt and Tunisia."
  
  
• Not in this report, but in another statement published in its website cartercenter.org, the Carter Centre wrote: "First, according to the election law and regulations, both counting and recounting should take place in the district where voting took place . . . While recognizing serious security concerns, the decision to count and recount ballots from Kufra in Tripoli is inconsistent with the law and violates the principle of transparency. Second . . . on several occasions auditors at the tally center appeared to correct calculations or typographical mistakes without the knowledge of polling staff . . . Third, triggers for quarantining questionable results were extremely limited. According to HNEC officials, the database was programmed to quarantine results forms in which the data was inconsistent, the number of votes received by candidates exceeded the number of votes cast, or turnout was greater than 100 percent of registered voters. In the future, the HNEC should consider employing additional and more stringent quarantine triggers, for instance, to detect over 95 percent votes for a one candidate; extremely high turnout in a particular polling station; or discrepancies in the reconciliation of used, unused, spoiled, and cancelled ballots with final vote totals."
  
  
• "On the afternoon of election day, a decision was made by electoral officials in Benghazi to allow registered voters from three polling centers to vote in any polling center in the district.[2] Legally, this decision is contrary to electoral regulations that state that voters are only allowed to vote in the center where they have registered, and that polling staff should not allow anyone whose name is not on the voters' list to vote.[3] The Center acknowledges the extenuating circumstances under which this action was taken. While exceptional, these decisions could have been avoided if the HNEC had adopted an emergency operational plan in advance, rather than taking decisions on a case-by-case basis. In future elections, an emergency operational plan should be developed and widely disseminated to HNEC district offices and polling staff prior to election day." (http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/libya-071812.html)
  
  
• "Five polling centers in Sidra opened only on the following day, July 8, and three polling centers in Kufra and Ribiana opened only on July 10."
  
  

Downloadthe full Shahed Report from Temehu.com (written in both Arabic and English)

Downloadthe full Shahed Report from the HNEC website: http://www.hnec.ly/modules/publisher/item.php?itemid=346

Downloadthe full Carter Centre Libya Statement

Armed Assailants Invade The Libyan Tourism Department's Building

The Libyan Tourism Department held an emergency meeting on the 25th of June 2012, to discuss the current issues facing the department under the transitional government. Earlier in the week the building of the department was raided by a group of 40 people, 20 of whom were armed, in an attempt to take over the building. The armed group presented a letter, allegedly signed by the deputy defence minister, authorising them to use "force" to evacuate and take over the building. The employees of the tourism department defended their headquarters and refused to leave. When the minister arrived later, he informed the employees that he had no knowledge of the authorisation. The assailants failed to intimidate the staff and left shortly afterwards.

The meeting was held to clarify the incident and discuss a number of important issues facing the tourism department in current Libya. To this day Libya still does not have a tourism ministry, despite Libya's massive tourism heritage and in spite of the potential of tourism becoming Libya's main source of income in the future.

The department made a number of legitimate demands including:

• Implementing "transparency" requirements by all the managers and heads of departments at the Tourism Department.
• Freezing all the procedures of the managers and the heads of departments at the Tourism Department.
• Initiating an enquiry regarding the spending of "budgets" during the "revolution".
• Investigating the department's officials for "squandering the general wealth".
• Investigating all the previous contracts struck in the past.
  

Libyan Tourist Visa Update (8) & New Tourism Laws:

The new "Tourism Department" in Tripoli has confirmed that "tourist visas" are back. However, the reopened visa will be granted only for tourists who intend to travel along the coast for the purpose of tourism. The procedure for the tourist visa stays the same as before.


The Prime Minister's Office has issued three decrees regarding tourism in Libya: Decree 141 of year 2012 devolves the apparatus of "Tourism Police" to the Ministry of Interior; Decree 122 of year 2012 renames the "General Board of Tourism & Traditional Industries" to the "Tourism Department"; and Decree 130 of year 2012 reorganises the "General Board of Tourism & Antiquities". 

For full report and downloadable copies of the new decrees, please see:

http://www.temehu.com/news-Libya.htm

Berber Separatism: Text Out of Context

The above Arabic text shows the answer of Mahmoud al-NakouaIn, NTC's representative to London, to the question of "separatism" in Libya.

In an interview with Magazine magazine, as quoted by the website of the Libyan embassy in London (http://ntclibya.org.uk), the honourable writer says the percentage of ethnic or "racial" movements in Libya is "small", and all of which had declared their loyalty to the "nation"; but "they" do need to enjoy some kind of freedom, use "their language" (meaning Berber), and name their children as they wish. 

He also said that Gaddafi came in conflict "with them" [meaning with the Berbers] and banned "them" from using "their language" [meaning Tamazight] and "suppressed their culture"; but now "they" are looking forward to "bring out" this aspect of "their" culture which is their "right", and there is no problem regarding this, he says. We do not fear any danger from this side, as Libya has now passed the danger zone, he affirmed.

That was more-or-less the translation of the text in the above image. At first reading, these appear good words, but a closer look at the "terminology" used one cannot escape the old same "story". 

The first thing one notices is that most of these Arab writers and speakers never specifically mention "Berber" or "Berbers" by name, and most often they use terms like "them", "they" and "ethnic components" to refer to the native Berbers of Libya [as bracketed above]. The terms Berber and Imazighen are taboos as well as "sensitive issues Libyans rarely talk about".  Why?

Secondly, most Libyans already know that the Berbers of Libya have no intention nor have made any demands regarding "separatism" as such. Where did these "accusations" come from? Even if they were made somewhere, they must be "very small", and do not represent the Berbers' demands, at all. The Berbers have always stood united with all Libyans and they have no intention of dividing Libya or any other country for that matter.

All this talk of "separatism" and "foreign agendas" is old, very old indeed, and was used before by despots to suppress the true demands of the "persecuted natives" of so many countries from around the world, European ones included.

Not to say,  "self determination" does not mean "separatism" but unity on equal basis. But that may be too-daring "truth" many see dangerous to uphold. Ask any critic to present evidence for these "foreign agendas" and  "separatism" and they will give you none. Why?

Honourable leaders and writers ought to refrain from using "unfair" and "untrue" labels, particularly at this critical stage;  and one can only agree with the Honourable writer when he called for the need to use "positive" and "good" words to aid solving the issues troubling the Libyan society, and the need for people to read more than write.

But there it seems the usual attempt to "mask" the true demands of the Berbers, simply "official recognition of identity" and "greater freedom to express their unique culture", by labeling them with "separatism" and even "terrorism" (in the case of the Tuareg Berbers), does allure time. Why?

Why not represent the Berbers' demands as they are without taking them out of con-text?

Libya's First Democratic Elections: Zuwarah

Abubaker Attaloua', the president of Zuwarah's Local Council.

The Berber city of Zuwarah became the first ever city in Libya to organise and hold democratic elections after the liberation of Libya, while they were still fighting to liberate their town alone. The following Libya TV interview (in Berber) speaks to some of the organisers of the elections, including Ashour Almansouri, who pointed out that the NTC should have published guidelines and laws governing the elections in Libya. But due to lack of such guidelines from the government the Zuwarah elections, he said, were a local effort based on the goodwill of the people. 

A few months later the NTC did publish the "Election Law Project" but the law was unusually un-numbered and undated! People in Mesratha are still protesting at the Justice Square (رفع-الاعتصام-الدائم-إلى-اعتصام-ثقافي-ب), demanding elections (to elect the local council, "correct the path", and other issue that were a constant source of protests across Libya in the past two months). In fact even the protests started in Benghazi on the 12th of December 2011 are still going in Tree Square, as of January 2012 (اعتصامات-في-ميدان-الشجرة-تدخل-شهرها-ال).

The story of Zuwarah's first elections in New Libya -- in Tamazight ('Berber Language').
Temehu.com has summarised the main points made by each speaker in English as follows:

Ashour Almansouri had clarified a number of issues regarding the actual procedure:

• A vote of 51% is required to declare a winner, and if there was no winner, then the first and the second will go into the second round of elections to decide the final winner.

• When he was asked to provide details, he said that a Preparation Committee was first of all selected to organise and prepare for the elections.

• Regarding the actual list of the candidates he says originally there were twelve people who put their names forward for the elections, but five withdrew their names later including one woman, just before the elections started. 

• They set up two polling stations, facing each other, one for men voters and the other for women, he said.

• The revolutionaries, he added, demanded extending the elections for another day because many fighters still fighting in the frontline (in liberated Libya), and this they did, and attendance overall he said was "reasonable".

• They offered to conduct the counting of votes before the voters themselves, to make sure of the results, but he said most voters declared their loyalty to and trust in the Committee, and that even those who did not vote were happy with the results -- amazing.

• The winner was Dr. Abubaker Ibrahim Attaloua', who secured a majority of 63.48 % of the vote.

• But the total number of people who voted was only 1585 voters -- hardly a democratic representation of Zuwarah -- just over 3% of the population of Zuwarah (according to the outdated census).

• When he was asked if the elections can be repeated to allow more people the chance to take part, he replied by saying that the election stations continued to be open in the second day until there were no voters outside, and that the winner will remain the head of the council until the transitional period of the NTC comes to an end.

Zuwarah's Libya's First Elections. 

Muneer Bosaoud says that the idea of the elections goes back to the Crisis Council that was set up in Djerba, in Tunisia, by the Berbers of Zuwara to assist during the war for freedom. After the presumed liberation the members of the Crisis Council returned to Zuwarah; many of whom resigned from the council because Libya was declared liberated, and because, they said, a new council should be formed to represent the whole of Zuwarah and not just a few self-appointed activists. 

• The remaining five members immediately began debating the idea of holding an election in Zuwarah to elect a democratic council to represent the whole community of Zuwarah. 

• The names of the remaining team are as follows: Muneer Abosaoud, Salim Mousa, Sha'ban Bosaoud, Othman Rwiha, and Salah Sha'ban Senusi. 

• They prepared their plan and then took it to Adel Alkhallas, who represented legitimate authority in Zuwarah at the time, Muneer said, and requested from him to work with them.

• The committee included two representatives from each of the various civil components of the Berber society including two from the February Revolutionaries -- all men, without a single woman.

• The whole operation was executed with speed, he adds, because the previous members of the Crisis Council who resigned left a "vacuum" in administration, which they felt needed to fill immediately. This may explain the very low number of voters who turned up to vote, or is the cause of the low turnout to begin with! It seems that everything, like elsewhere, done in a hurry under the pretext of urgency and in realty progress is deadly slow!

• Muneer emphasised the transparency issue, and added that the councils of Tripoli, Mesratha and Tajura had also demanded similar elections, and it is an honour for all of us for others to follow the experiment of Zuwarah if it succeeds. 

Fawzi Elmeskhout however was positively critical and to the point:

• He says first of all we must know that Zuwarah has not been liberated like other Libyan towns and cities because it is surrounded by the so-called "Black Crescent" -- in reference to the Arab villages surrounding Zuwarah, almost all of which are still supporting Gaddafi (nearly three months after liberation); but it is an honour, he adds, that Zuwarah had "lifted our heads high" for being the first in Libya to hold democratic elections.

Khaled Ftis moreover provides more information about the elected council, which slightly differ from Muneer's statement: 

• Khaled said they did select a council, and that the members of the council were elected to advise the president of the council (Dr. Abubaker) and work with him for the benefit of all; but no one took any notice of them. The elected head Dr. Abubaker Attaloua', he adds, acts alone, making his own decisions, without any regard to the other members of the council, and that he has no administration and is influenced and directed from outside! 

• He said that the fact that we have organised the first elections in Libya is a clear sign that we are not "secluding" ourselves and that we are not "negative" as we have been criticised by others.

• He also pointed out the need to translate what the Berbers debate in Tamazight to Arabic, so that all Libyans can understand what the Berbers are talking about. This is a valid point often overlooked by the current government of Libya, as it made no attempt to educate the Arabs of Libya about the true identity of the Berbers in Libya, about their Libyan culture, and about the persecution they endured under the previous regimes. The NTC needs to supervise the democratic debate over the Berber crisis.