| 'Political Entities': الكيانات السياسية | Percentage | Seats | |
| 1 | National Forces Alliance | 48.8% | 39 |
| 2 | Justice and Construction | 21.3% | 17 |
| 3 | The National Front Party | 3.8% | 3 |
| 4 | Wadi Alhayat Gathering | 2.5% | 2 |
| 5 | The Union for Homeland | 2.5% | 2 |
| 6 | National Centrist Party | 2.5% | 2 |
| All other parties | 18.8% | 15 | |
| Total: 100.2% | Total: 80 | ||
- Article (30) of the Constitutional Declaration (CD) says the NTC must within 90 days of liberation issue a special law for electing the General National Congress and for appointing the HNEC. But Law 4/2012 was passed on 28th of January 2012. Law 29 itself, regulating 'political parties', was passed on the 2nd of May 2012; and applying for registering political parties was only scheduled to start from the 26th of May 2012. The Constitutional Amendment Number 3 (2012) was passed on the 5th of July 2012 -- just two days before the election day.
- The published percentages add up to 100.2%, even though the PDFfile published by the HNEC shows the total to be 100.0%. This may be considered as a minor error and should be ignored, no doubt, but considering it is to do with "counting" and more so with "counting votes", accuracy is paramount, simply because such errors would naturally shed some doubt over the accuracy of the results overall.
- Only 12 constituencies (or districts) out of 13 constituencies are included in party elections. The excluded constituency, by mere chance, happened to be "Constituency 8" -- largely dominated by the [persecuted] Berbers of Nafousa Mountain and the Berbers of Ghadames. Why one constituency out of all other Libyan constituencies is barred from taking part in party elections? There were a number of issues and inconsistencies in relation to both the constitutional declaration and the whole electoral system adopted by the NTC. The Carter report recommended that "In future, the election management body should give careful consideration to the protection of minority rights in the voter registration process [p. 13]."
- Article (6) of the ConstitutionalDeclaration "promises" all Libyans "equal opportunities", and while NTC's Law14/2012 lists a total of 13 constituencies in Libya (even though the numbers in the table jump from 7 to 9, giving a total of 12 and not 13), in reality only 12 constituencies were allowed to take part in the party-election; thereby depriving Libyan voters from one single constituency from having equal opportunity to vote for party-elections. On the other hand, most of the other constituencies were allowed to vote for both: "parties" and "individuals" -- even though the Shahed report (see below) stated that one of the HNEC staff in Derna had prevented the use of both voting ballots (individuals and parties) and asked voters to use only one of them!
- Of course, Article (6) of the Constitutional Declaration violates the Constitutional Declaration itself by declaring all Libyans are "equal" regardless of "language", while at the same time Article (1) declares "Arabic" the only official language in Libya -- even though "Berber" is the native language of Libya and not Arabic. [See the Carter Centre Statement, below, for further violations of the Constitutional Declaration.]
- Serious violations in Tripoli were reported by "Shahed Network for Election Monitoring" (see election observers' reports, below): "there were noticeable campaigns inside the polling centre to affect the voters. This contradicts the election Law and procedures and considered as a serious violation of voters’ right to vote freely, therefore, Shahed team call the HNEC to consider all procedures that prevent these abuses."
- HNEC Staff Violations: the Shahed report reveals more serious violations by officials to influence the voters to favour a particular party in Sbeedat School centre in the "seventh constituency". Also voters in Shohadaa Alkhaleej School centre were influenced by an "active campaign" for the favour of some [unnamed] party. In one of women's centres in Murzuq the voters were influenced to favour one particular unnamed party. In Khoms (centre No. 1003152) the wrong candidate lists were delivered to the centre; and the voters’ lists from Khoms were mixed with other voters' lists from Meslateh.
- Special Needs: according to the Shahed Report,
15% of the polling centres were unqualified to receive people with special needs,
thereby preventing this category of Libyans from their right to vote. The Shahed
report can be downloaded from the website of the HNEC, or by clicking on the
link provided at the end of these observations.
- The only Libyan website so far to reference the violation of Article (6) is Alwatan (ملاحظاتحول الانتخابات الليبية يمكن أن تشكل خروقات انتخابية يجوز الطعن فيها). According to Dr. Abdullah Arrabthi, from the Medicine College at Tripoli University, there are other "breaches" that may warrant the results to be legally challenged against Article (6), such as the election and party laws were not published early enough to allow parties and candidates enough time to make themselves known to the voters. One comment left for Dr. Arrabthi's report stated that Mahmoud Jibril used his photo for the advertising campaign for the NFA even though he is not a candidate, and that many Libyans were puzzled not to find his name in the list of the candidates they voted for; implying that people thought they were voting for Mahmoud Jibril when in fact he is not a candidate.
- Appeals: the HNEC in its website (http://www.hnec.ly/modules/publisher/item.php?itemid=350) announced that voters have two days to lodge any appeals they might have, starting from the date on which the results were released. The results were published on the 17th of July at 9pm (3 hours before the end of the day), but this appeal announcement was published by the HNEC in its website on the 18th of July -- a day after the results were made known. The two days are followed by a total 12 days for the judges to look into the appeals, according to the following process:وذكر "العبار" أن هذه الفترة ستستمر لمدة أربعة عشر يوما وقد خُصصت على النحو التالي : يومان للطعن في النتائج الآولية ، ثم يومان للنظر في الطعن من قبل القاضي الجزئي ، ثم خمسة لاستئناف قرار القاضي الجزئي ، ثم خمسة أيام أخر للنظر في الإستئناف من قبل رئيس المحكمة الإبتدائية أو من يفوضه ، وذلك وفقا للقانون رقم أربعة، وأضاف أن بعد إستكمال مرحلة الطعون سيتم الإعلان عن النتائج النهائية والمصادقة عليها ، والتي ستبدأ بها مرحلة انتقال السلطة من المجلس الوطني الإنتقالي المؤقت إلى المؤتمر الوطني العام
Election Observers' Reports:
The HNEC's website lists four reports, by the African Union, Shahed Network for Election Monitoring, the Arab league, and the Carter Centre. The Carter report linked to from the website of the HNEC contains hardly any observations, let alone violations, in comparison to the copy found at the website of the Carter Centre itself. In this Carter's report one reads, "Many people who spoke with Carter Center observers expressed excitement at their new ability to speak freely and to discuss politics without fear of intimidation." The following observations were extracted from the Shahed and the Carter reports:
(1) - The Shahed Report:
- "Shahed Network is a domestic election observation initiative. It consists of civil society organizations and individuals in each of the (13) main constituencies in Libya. Shahed is committed to observing the electoral process in accordance with internationally recognized standards of domestic election observation. The network consists of volunteers who plan to be present in as many polling stations as possible. Shahed Network is working with, and supported by NDI."
- High turnout in Tripoli, Misrata, Benghazi and Sabha.
- Modest turnout in Albaydaa and Ajdabya.
- HNEC staff were transparent in their methods and procedures.
- Up to 96% of the polling stations witnessed the availability of all the necessary materials required.
- The necessary materials for the election process were not delivered to Khaled Bin Alwaleed School centre in Brega.
- There are a number of incidents where HNEC staff showed lack of understanding of voting procedures: one of the staff in Darnah area prevented the use of both voting ballots (individuals and parties) and asked voters to use only one of them.
- Albayda: there has been total chaos due to the absence of the staff responsible for female voters.
- Ain Zara centre: the wrong voting ballots were delivered to the centre.
- Khoms (centre No. 1003152): the wrong candidate lists
were delivered to the centre; and the voters’ lists from Khoms were mixed
with other voters' lists from Msellatah.
- Shahed team observed that most of the polling centres were easily reachable with no obstacles.
- 15% of the polling centres were unqualified to receive people with special needs, preventing this category of Libyans from their right of voting.
- Delay in opening some polling stations, as in Shohadaa Azzawiah School centre
in Benghazi, Awad Abbar School centre, centre No. (40022), Zarqa Alyamamah centre,
centre No. (031402), and Ibraheem Gazaari School centre.
- Most of the polling centres witnessed a good security environment.
- Major security violations in Albaydaa, Ajdabya and Tobruk:
- Polling centres were attacked and voting process suspended in many polling centres.
- Voting materials were stolen in Attaleah School centre; apparent chaos.
- Voting materials were stolen: the following centres were attacked by armed men who threatened the staff of the HNEC to stop the election process:
- Annahdah School
- Independence School
- Omar Mukhtar School
- Martyrs of the Damour School
- Ali Issa School
- Wehdah School
- Tarek ibn Ziyad School
- All the polling centres in Ajdabya were attacked and suffered from "total chaos".
- Khansaa School centre in Albaydaa: total chaos reported, due to a "brawl in the polling centre".
- Marej: voting boxes were stolen and the centre was attacked.
- Ballot boxes were stolen in centre No. (0100741) by a "group of armed men with white guns".
- Ashbelieh centre in "Gryan": the staff and women voters were attacked: shooting, chaos and stealing ballot boxes.
- Alquba: Afreeqa centre was attacked by armed men.
- Ekhlas and Karameh School centre: ballot boxes were stolen by armed
men.
- Benghazi:
- Freedom School: explosives (gelatin) were used in the polling centres:
- Ibraheem Jarari School centre: was completely destroyed.
- Brigades of Freedom School: attacked by a number of armed men who "detained the staff", with "total chaos" and "shooting inside the centre".
- Jamal Abdel Nasser School was "burned in Gmenes".
- Ajdabya-Wehdah centre: ballot boxes were stolen.
- Ajdabya: Independence School centre: ballot boxes were stolen.
- Alabyar: the polling centre was burned.
- Shohadaa Abo Eareeq centre: polling centre was burned.
- Omar Mukhtar School centre: attacked and the voting process was suspended.
- Tripoli: Qalaah School centre: the observers and candidates representatives were dismissed by the station director.
- Tripoli: Halab School centre: there were "noticeable campaigns inside
the polling centre to affect the voters. This contradicts the election Law and
procedures and considered as a serious violation of voters’ right to vote freely,
therefore, Shahed team call the HNEC to consider all procedures that prevent
these abuses."
(2) - The Carter Report:
- "The Carter Center conducted a limited election observation mission, accrediting 45 observers from 21 countries and deploying 16 teams of observers. On election day, observers visited more than 160 polling stations in 11 of 13 electoral districts, including teams in Ajdabiya, Al Bayda, Zuwiya, Gharyan, Khoms, Benghazi, Sebha, Sabrata, Tobruk, Tripoli, and Zuwara."
- "Carter Center observers were present for the full count at only
eight polling stations. This sample is too small to offer a reliable assessment
of the counting process."
- Violations of the Constitutional Declaration: according to the Carter report published at: http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/pr/libya-prelim-statement-070912.pdf , "On July 5, 2012, just two days before election day, the NTC issued a third amendment to the interim constitution, this time stating that the election of the constitution drafting body would be carried out through free and direct suffrage, “taking into consideration Libya’s cultural and linguistic diversity.” This change is inconsistent with best practice, which calls for no changes to the legal framework within three months of an election [8]. In this case, the decision may have impaired voters’ ability to understand what they were voting for and thus to make an informed choice."
- "In future, the election management body should give careful consideration
to the protection of minority rights in the voter registration process [p. 13]."
- NTC's elections law does not include all the provisions governing the electoral
process. Many important provisions were left to the executive regulations issued
by HNEC over a period of four months and up to seven days before election
day.
- Since the release of the controversial constitutional declaration and the ensued elections and constituencies laws, the Berbers of Tripolitania (including Nafusa), the Cyrenaicans, and the Libyans of Fezzan were protesting against the electoral system and its multitude of laws and amendments issued by the NTC without consultation with the Libyan people. But no one came to their aid with some "observations". The Carter Statement says the Electoral System adopted by the NTC, which uses three electoral systems for the GNC elections, made it more difficult for political entities, candidates, and voters to understand the process; and it also had implications for counting and tabulation. "While elections in general aim to determine the will of the people and to promote their right to select their own government, the specific type of electoral system that is chosen promotes different types of representation and political behavior."
- There "were isolated incidents of [candidate] posters being
defaced or torn down in Benghazi during the last week of June. As the election
drew closer, observers noted that posters had been damaged in several other cities,
including Zuwarah, Al Bayda, and Derna."
- "Future electoral management bodies should devote increased resources
and efforts to conduct voter information and education campaigns to deepen the
voters’ understanding of the process and encourage increased participation in
the political process."
- Several young voters were potentially excluded from the process due to
an early cutoff of the registration deadline [25]."
- The "design of the electoral system and the quota structure does
not guarantee gender equity in the congress. The Carter Center strongly urges
that measures be implemented to ensure the effective representation of women
in any elected assembly in the future [12]."
- "Although women played a notable role during the uprising, only
585 women registered as candidates. The vast majority of female candidates registered
on the PR list. Only 85 women registered as individual candidates."
- The "brief exhibition period did not adequately allow voters to
review the registry and make the necessary corrections."
- "The HNEC announced the final lists of candidates on June 18, 2012,
less than three weeks before election day, leaving a very narrow window for the
candidates to campaign."
- "The election commission did not monitor probable violations of
campaign finance regulations during the campaign period . . . "
- "The Center regrets that only 8,043 overseas voters cast a ballot
in these historic elections . . . While geographic considerations were taken
into account, there are questions about the choice not to extend OCV to certain
countries where large numbers of Libyan nationals reside, such as in Egypt and
Tunisia."
- Not in this report, but in another statement published in its website cartercenter.org, the Carter Centre wrote: "First, according to the election law and regulations, both counting and recounting should take place in the district where voting took place . . . While recognizing serious security concerns, the decision to count and recount ballots from Kufra in Tripoli is inconsistent with the law and violates the principle of transparency. Second . . . on several occasions auditors at the tally center appeared to correct calculations or typographical mistakes without the knowledge of polling staff . . . Third, triggers for quarantining questionable results were extremely limited. According to HNEC officials, the database was programmed to quarantine results forms in which the data was inconsistent, the number of votes received by candidates exceeded the number of votes cast, or turnout was greater than 100 percent of registered voters. In the future, the HNEC should consider employing additional and more stringent quarantine triggers, for instance, to detect over 95 percent votes for a one candidate; extremely high turnout in a particular polling station; or discrepancies in the reconciliation of used, unused, spoiled, and cancelled ballots with final vote totals."
- "On the afternoon of election day, a decision was made by electoral officials in Benghazi to allow registered voters from three polling centers to vote in any polling center in the district.[2] Legally, this decision is contrary to electoral regulations that state that voters are only allowed to vote in the center where they have registered, and that polling staff should not allow anyone whose name is not on the voters' list to vote.[3] The Center acknowledges the extenuating circumstances under which this action was taken. While exceptional, these decisions could have been avoided if the HNEC had adopted an emergency operational plan in advance, rather than taking decisions on a case-by-case basis. In future elections, an emergency operational plan should be developed and widely disseminated to HNEC district offices and polling staff prior to election day." (http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/libya-071812.html)
- "Five polling centers in Sidra opened only on the following day,
July 8, and three polling centers in Kufra and Ribiana opened only on July 10."
Downloadthe full Shahed Report from the HNEC website: http://www.hnec.ly/modules/publisher/item.php?itemid=346
Downloadthe full Carter Centre Libya Statement
